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T

HE United States must soon choose whether it will continue to

support uniformity in the international law regulating the liabilities of air carriers to their customers or encourage diverse national
rules to be applied. This choice is required by action taken to amend
the existing international agreement, the Warsaw Convention,' under
which a uniform code now applies to the vast majority of the world's
air traffic. The amendment by the Protocol signed at the Hague in
September of 1955, poses the question whether we want to maintain
the uniformity now in effect. Failure of the United States to ratify
would permit at least two sets of international rules to become effective-the Protocol rules between the countries ratifying it and the
present Warsaw rules remaining in effect between the countries not
ratifying the Protocol. A worse possible result of a departure from
the usual United States policy supporting cooperation2 in arrange1 The Convention's official designation is International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air. It
was ratified by the Senate on June 15, 1934 and was proclaimed by the President,
June 27, 1934, 49 U.S. Stat. at L. Part 2, p. 3000; the English translation begins
at p. 3014.
2 In general, it has been United States policy to foster and encourage international agreement in matters affecting international air transportation. This
policy was reaffirmed by the 1954 statement of Civil Air Policy by the President's
Air Coordinating Committee (Gov. Printing Office, May 1954), pp. 37-8:
"Foreseeing the need for world-wide cooperation among nations for
the orderly advancement of post-war international civil aviation, the
United States in 1944 was instrumental in drawing up the Convention on
International Civil Aviation and has since then played a leading role in
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) established under
this Convention. The accomplishments of ICAO to date, particularly in
promoting safety of international aviation and in facilitating international
air commerce, have fully demonstrated the need for the continuance of
cooperative efforts in fostering the development of international civil
aviation.
"1. THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
(ICAO),
AND PROPOSES THAT ITS FUTURE ACTIVITIES BE CONSISTENT WITH THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES: (Emphasis in the
original.)
"D. THE ADOPTION OF CONVENTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL
AIR LAW NEEDED IN CONNECTION WITH INTERNATIONAL
AIR OPERATIONS." (Emphasis in the original.)
For a discussion of the importance of international agreements to U. S. international air transport, see also the report of the Senate Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Cimmittee on the McCarran Bill to amend the Civil Aeronautics Act,
S. 2647, Sen. Rep. No. 163, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. (1954) 77-85.
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ments vital to international air transport, is the result advocated by
some of refusing to ratify the Protocol and denouncing the basic
convention. It is the danger of action in this direction that prompts
a review of the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol and their
importance to international air commerce.
This paper contends that the advantages of uniform rules in this
field of international law are so substantial to American passengers.
shippers and air carriers, that American interests require the continuance of the uniform code established by the Warsaw Convention, and
require, therefore, the ratification of the Hague Protocol.
WARSAW PROVISIONS AND AMENDMENTS

The Warsaw Convention standardizes important aspects of the
obligations and rights of, and between, air carriers and passengers and
shippers in international air transportation. For example, minimum
contents of documents such as the passenger ticket, baggage check and
air waybill are specified in Articles 3, 4 and 8 of the Convention. The
basis for, and the maximum amount of, the liability of the carrier for
injury, death or damage are prescribed in Chapter III; while this
limits the amount recoverable, for example, for a passenger's injury
or death to $8,292, it also prevents the establishment of a lower limit
by statute or tariff rule (Article 23). It permits a higher limit to be
set by agreement (Article 22 (1)) and permits the court to award a
higher amount when the carrier's fault is equivalent to "willful misconduct" (Article 25). The Convention also prescribes which carrier
may be sued and where (Article 28), the time during which complaint
must be made (Article 26), and the time during which action must
be brought (Article 29). Article 30 specifies the rules applicable when
transportation is performed by successive carriers.
The Protocol signed at the Hague in September, 1955, would
make several changes." The limit on recoveries from air carriers for
personal injury and death would be doubled to $16,584 (Article XI).
The plaintiff could be allowed to recover attorneys' fees and court
costs under specified circumstances in addition to the judgment (Article XI). The obligations of the carrier to provide certain information
on transportation documents would be clarified and simplified (Articles III, IV, and VI). The provisions permitting recoveries to exceed
$16,584 would be clarified (Article XIII).
The Protocol may not amend the Convention as extensively as some
may wish, but the history of the amending process, the minute and
extensive examination given these amendments and dozens of other
proposals over a long period, makes clear that other or additional
proposals will not receive serious consideration now. Proposals were
made to amend the Convention before 1940 by both the International
Chamber of Commerce and IATA, but efforts to amend did not start
on an intergovernmental level until after the Second-Great War and
8 The Protocol is discussed in this issue by Calkins.
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then it took almost a decade to prepare amendments for ratification.
In 1946 CITEJA 4 met to consider amendments in January, July and
November. The Legal Commission of the Provisional International
Civil Aviation Organization debated amendment in May and June
of that year. The Legal Committee of ICAO thereafter considered
amendments or had revisions in various stages of preparation in each
succeeding year. Several drafts were prepared by Major K. M. Beaumont, the United Kingdom representative on the Committee, completely rewriting the Convention. These total revisions required
interested governments to review existing articles and proposals to
add new ones. Some governments, particularly the United States,
distributed these drafts and comments to organizations of lawyers,
government agencies, and interested carriers for review5 and suggestions. After such wide consideration, the Ninth Session of the Legal
Committee of ICAO in 1953 prepared the "Rio" draft which was
considered by the Convention at the Hague in September of 1955.
After this protracted scrutiny, study and debate, it seems clear that
the amendments included in the Hague Protocol are as many and as
good as can be agreed upon by negotiating nations for the present.
The choice before the United States, therefore, is narrowed. It is no
longer profitable to consider additional or different amendments of
the Warsaw system; if we want a uniform system, as we believe we do,
these amendments to the Warsaw Convention constitute the system we
can bring into effect in the reasonably near future.
THE UNIFORMITY ACHIEVED

The feature of the Warsaw Convention from which flows the greatest benefits for travelers, shippers and carriers, is the reduction of what
could be an extensive variety of rules of liability in international air
transportation into a simplified and standardized code. The potential
diversity of the rules without the Convention can be illustrated on a
relatively short international trip. Thus if a United States citizen
purchased a ticket in New York to travel from New York to Cairo via
BOAC Sabena and Air France, he would, in the course of the journey,
pass through the air space of at least nine jurisdictions and use the
carriers of three nations. If he were injured in Italy and his baggage
4 Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Juridique Ariens, International
Legal Committee of Technical Air Experts.
5 The articles discussing the amending proposals which have appeared in this
Journal are proof of the public discussion given the amendments in the past decade.
Knauth, "Some Notes on the Warsaw Conv. of 1929" (1947), 14 J. of Air
Law & Comm. 44.
Beaumont, "Some Anomalies Requiring Amendment in the Warsaw Convention of 1929" (1947), 14 J. of Air Law & Comm. 30.
Parker, "The Adequacy of Passenger Liability Limits in the Warsaw
Convention" (1947), 14 J. of Air Law & Comm. 37.
Wetter, "Possible Simplification of the Warsaw Convention Liability
Rules" (1948), 15 J. of Air Law & Comm. 1.
Beaumont, "The Proposed Protocol to the Warsaw Convention of 1929"
(1953), 20 J. of Air Law & Comm. 264.
Orr, "The Rio Revision of the Warsaw Convention," (1954) 39, 174.
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were damaged on the journey, it would be uncertain and baffling as
to which law governs his rights, which law determines the liability of
the carriers, which carrier should be the defendant, and how it can
be brought to trial. Very different answers to each of these questions
might be given if he sues in Britain, which is the home of BOAC, or
Belgium, the home of Sabena, or in Italy, the site of the accident, or
in France, the home of Air France, or in the United States, where the
passenger is domiciled and started his journey.
In cargo transport the variety of rules could be even more perplexing. Thus a shipment of watches from Switzerland to Peru might pass
through the air space and therefore the legal. jurisdiction of France,
England, Ireland, Iceland, Canada, the United States, Panama, Colombia, Equador and Peru. On this journey, the shipment could be
carried on four carriers. Presumably by designating the route, the
shipper, carrier and consignee could try to anticipate the possible
application of the laws of those countries to the contract of carriage
and provide for the foreseeable contingencies. But even such a prodigious effort would not have avoided the problems in a recent case
where the watches were carried beyond Peru to Bolivia.6
The diversity of law and the uncertainty of application, so much
a part of international commerce, is familiarly described by a leading
maritime lawyer:
"A learned Netherlander, Professor R. P. Cleveringa of the
University of Leyden, has recently discussed the same problem as
it relates to ocean shipping, and he puts this case: An Antwerp
merchant concludes, in London, a contract with a French shipowner
to transport 100 cases of crystalware from Rotterdam to New York
in a French-flag vessel. So the problem concerns France, England,
Holland and New York, It is by no means unusual to have a
business deal angled in four or more states, provinces, Dominions
or Nations. The bill of lading, issued in Rotterdam, states that the
carrier's liability shall not exceed 100 florins per case. On arrival,
one case is missing, and its true market value is 2,000 florins. How
much shall the French carrier pay the Belgian merchant? In
London, where the contract was made, the bill of lading limitation
is regarded as valid, and the merchant gets 100 florins. Under
French law, he gets 50,000 francs, which is 200 florins. Under
Dutch law, he gets 600 florins. And under New York law, he gets
$500, which is about 1,300 florins. Here are four answers to one
question concerning an international transport of goods. If private
international law exists as a single law, the question should have
one answer, and three of the four answers should be wrong. If the
law differs according to the independent national views of the
various nations, the question is capable of 88 or 89 answers-one
for each nation. And as several of the nations are federal unions
of sovereign States, cantons, provinces, there could be as many as
200 answers as the world is politically ordered today." 7
6 The fact that Bolivia is not a party to the Warsaw Convention accentuates
United States interest in extending the acceptance of the uniform rules.
7 "Aviation Law and Maritime Law," Arnold W. Knauth, (1954) 35 Chi. B.
Rec. 199-212.
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A parallel situation which illustrates both the problem and the
solution was this country's experience before and after the Carmack
Amendment of 19068 to the Interstate Commerce Act. Before that
amendment, the shipper, when his traffic moved over the lines of
several rail carriers through the jurisdiction of two or more states, had
to look to state laws to recover damages. The difficulties of the shipper
seeking recovery in such cases were so great they were termed "almost
insuperable" by the courts.
"It has frequently been explained by the courts that the purpose
of the Carmack Amendment was to do away with the difficulties
shippers had encountered in seeking to recover against carriers for
damages to property carried over more than one line of railroad.
The obstacles met by a shipper in attempting to locate responsibility for damages to property shipped over different lines of railroad
were almost insuperable, and frequently the shipment, as in this
case, was not only over several lines, but for long distances and in
several different states. To afford a remedy for such a condition
Congress gave the shipper the right to institute an action against
the carrier receiving his property for an interstate shipment, and
to recover damages occurring anywhere in the course of the transportation, leaving it to the carrier receiving the property to recover

from the carrier on whose line or lines the damage or injury occurred." Looney v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 271 Ill. 538, 111
N.E. 509, 510 (1916).

The United States Supreme Court commented on this problem as

follows:
"Neither uniformity of obligation nor of liability was possible
until Congress should deal with the subject. The situation was

well depicted by the supreme court of Georgia in Southern P. Co. v.
Crenshaw Bros. 5 Ga. App. 675, 63 S.E. 865, where that court said:
"'Some states allow carriers to exempt themselves from all or
a part of the common-law liability by rule, regulation, or contract;
others did not. The Federal courts sitting in the various states
were following the local rule, a carrier being held liable in one
court when, under the same state of facts, he would be exempt from
liability in another. Hence this branch of interstate commerce was
being subjected to such a diversity of legislative and judicial holding that it was practically impossible for a shipper engaged in a
business that extended beyond the confines of his own state, or a
carrier whose lines were extensive, to know, without considerable
investigation and trouble, and even then oftentimes with but little
certainty, what would be the carrier's actual responsibility as to
goods delivered to it for transportation from one state to another.
The congressional action has made an end to this diversity, for the

national law is paramount and supersedes all state laws as to the
rights and liabilities and exemptions created by such transactions.
This was doubtless the purpose of the law . . .'" Adams Ezp. Co.

v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 57 L. ed. 314, 319-20 (1913).
If differences between states whose laws are based on the common
law, as is true in our country, have posed problems for shippers which
were "almost insuperable"; it can safely be concluded that the enforce834 Stat. 593 (1906), 49 U.S.C.A. 20 (11)

(1951).
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ment of rights in nations as diverse as those flown over in world air
transport, would impose even more prodigious burdens.
American concern about the lack of uniformity in international
law on this subject, before the Warsaw Convention was adhered to by
the United States, was expressed by the Aeronautical Chamber of
Commerce of America, Inc., in its recommendations to the Secretary
of State. It recommended adherence to the Convention "thus alleviating the chaotic conditions which now confront American international
air transport operators and the public with respect to matter coming
within the purview of the Convention."
The desirability of uniformity was explained by Judge Steuer in
his charge to the jury in Froman v. Pan American 1953 U.S. Av. R. 1,
4 (1953) where he said:
"The general law in regard to the happening of an accident is

that it is governed by the law of the place where the accident happened, and that has this peculiar consequence: that the laws of
different places being very different, if an accident happened on
one part of the flight the passengers might have a perfect right
to recover and if the same thing happened in a different part of
the flight they might not have any rights whatsoever.
"That was the situation that prevailed during the very early
days of international flights, and it was found for various reasons
that that was an entirely unsatisfactory condition ...
"When that situation became apparent the representatives of
thirty different nations met to draft a code to make the law uniform
as regards flights of this character and to avoid the consequences of
having different laws in different places. That meeting was held
in Warsaw and the result of it is called the Warsaw Convention."

The goal of establishing a uniform international code on the subject has been achieved with considerable success; both in terms of the
number of jurisdictions which apply it and the world's airlines which
are governed by it.
Its provisions are agreed to by 107 jurisdictions, made up of 45
nations and 62 dependencies.10
9 Message from the President of the United States transmitting the Warsaw
Convention, April 9, 1934. 73d Congress, Exec. G.
10 The parties to the Warsaw Convention are:
Argentina
Ethiopia
Australia
Finland
including Nauru,
France
New Guinea,
including territories whose
Norfolk Island,
external relations are under
Papua
her authority
Belgium
Germany
including all territories
Greece

subject to the sovereignty

or authority of Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burma
Canada
Ceylon
Czechoslovakia
Denmark and the Faroe Islands
Egypt

Hungary

Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Including territories under
Italian administration
Japan
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The extent to which the important international airline competitors of the U. S. flag lines are governed by the Warsaw Convention
can be seen by examining the nationality of the airlines operating on
the important international air routes. Across the Atlantic, between
the United States and principal European cities, thirteen scheduled air
carriers operate, and each of them flies the flag of a country which
is a party to the Warsaw Convention.
Across the Pacific routes, between the United States on the one
hand and Tokyo, Manila, and Melbourne on the other, five scheduled
Liberia
(d) Togoland under United
Liechtenstein
Kingdom trusteeship
Luxembourg
Hong Kong
Mexico
Jamaica (including Turks and Caicos
Netherlands
Islands and the Cayman Islands)
Netherlands Antilles
Kenya (Colony and Protectorate)
Netherlands New Guinea
Leeward IslandsSurinam
Antigua
New Zealand
Montserrat
including Cook Islands,
St. Christopher, Nevis and
Tokelau Islands and
Anguilla
Western Samoa
Virgin Islands
Norway
Malta
Including all territories
Mauritius
subject to the sovereignty
Nigeriaor authority of Norway
(a) Colony
Pakistan
(b) Protectorate
Philippines
(c) Cameroons under United
Poland
Kingdom trusteeship
Portugal
North Borneo
Rumania
Northern Rhodesia
Spain, including:
Nyausland Protectorate
colonies
St. Helena and Ascension
Spanish Morocco
Sarawak
Sweden
Settlements of Penang and Malacca
Switzerland
Seychelles
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Sierra Leone (Colony and
United Kingdom and
Protectorate)
Aden (Colony and Protectorate)
Singapore
Bahamas
Somaliland Protectorate
Barbados
Swaziland
Basutoland
Tanganyika
Bechuanal and Protectorate
Trinidad and Tobago
Bermuda
Uganda Protectorate
British Guiana
Windward IslandsBritish Honduras
Dominica
British Solomon Islands Protectorate
Grenada
Cyprus
St. Lucia
Falkland Islands and Dependencies
St. Vincent
Fiji
Zanzibar Protectorate
Gambia (Colony and Protectorate)
Union of South Africa
Gibraltar
United States
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony
including all territories
Gold Coastsubject to the sovereignty or
authority of the United States
(a) Colony
(b) Ashanti
Venezuela
(c) Northern Territories
Yugoslavia
I. Documentation, The Hague Conference 69, ICAO (1955). In addition
to the countries listed in that publication, Union of South Africa ratified
the Convention on March 22, 1955, Venezuela and Egypt adhered to it
on June 15, 1955 and Sept. 6, 1955, respectively.
11 The thirteen carriers are PAA and TWA (U. S.), KLM (The Netherlands),
Air France (Fr.), BOAC (U. K.), SAS (Norway, Sweden and Denmark), Sabena
(Belgium), Swissair (SW), El al (Israel), Iberia (SP), Lufthansa (Germany),
LAI (Italian) and Loftleidir (Iceland), Official Airline Guide, Nov. 1956, p. D-31.
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airlines are in operation and each of these also flies the flag of a
2
country which is a party to the Warsaw Convention.1
Only on the Caribbean air routes between the United States and
Latin America is this unanimity not maintained. Twenty-nine airlines
operate between the United States and points to the south, twenty of
which are nationals of countries which are parties to the Warsaw
Convention. 8
Another important measure of the uniformity which has been
achieved by the Warsaw Convention would be to determine the proportion of the world's international air traffic which is governed by its
rules. The exact proportions cannot be determined from available
sources because while the Warsaw Convention applies to contracts for
carriage between signatory countries, it also applies to other traffic,
such as passenger traffic moving from a signatory country to a nonsignatory country and which is traveling on a round trip ticket.
Nevertheless, an interesting facet of the traffic affected can be deduced
from the airline revenues reported to ICAO. Forty-four airlines operating international air transportation services reported revenues for
1954 of $1,989,000,000; 99.98% of these revenues were earned by 42
14
carriers of countries which are parties to the Warsaw Convention.
While all of the revenues of these carriers were not necessarily earned
from traffic which would be governed by the Warsaw Convention, it
would seem clear that the Warsaw rules served as the basic liability
rules for most of the world's international air traffic. 15
12The five carriers are PAA and NW (U. S.), CPA (Canadian), JAL
(Japan), QEA (Australian). Official Airline Guide, Nov. 1956, p. D-4.
18Official Airline Guide, Nov. '56, p. D-26. The nine carriers which are nationals of non-Warsaw countries are: Avianca (Col.), Cubana and "Q" Airways
(Cuba), AREA (Ecuador), TACA (home office listed in Louisiana, but a carrier
of El Salvador), APA (Panama), LACSA (Costa Rica), CDA (Dominican Republic) and TAN (Honduras).
14 ICAO, Digest of Statistics No. 55, 1954, p. 36.
15Additional traffic is governed by the Warsaw rules because several states
apply some or all of the rules of the Warsaw Convention to their domestic air
transport. These countries include Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway and the United Kingdom. Doe. 7450-LC/136, Vol. II, Annex VI, Appendix
VII, Ninth Session of the Legal Committee, Rio De Janeiro, 25 August-12 September, 1953. Another measure of the reach of the Warsaw provisions is that in seven
of the eight U. S. airline accidents, involving fatalities, in scheduled international
air transportation, in which the accident occurred in a foreign jurisdiction and
therefore would have been subject to the tort law of that jurisdiction, the place
of the accident was a Warsaw country. Only the 1947 accident in Syria occurred
in a non-Warsaw country. The accidents of the last 10 years referred to are:
October 3, 1946
Stephenville, Newfoundland
December 28, 1946
Rineanna, Eire
June 19, 1947
Mayadine, Syria
April 15, 1948
Shannon, Eire
August 31, 1950
Cairo, Egypt
June 22, 1951
Enroute Monrovia, Liberia, Africa
April 29, 1952
Carolina, Brazil
July 27, 1952
Nr. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Three occurred over the High Seas, so the U. S. could apply its own law
June 11, 1951
Enroute Miami, Fla.
August 10, 1952
Over South Island, Atlantic Ocean
March 26, 1955
Pacific Ocean 35 Mi. from Newport, Oregon
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OF THE UNIFORM

RULES

To obtain agreement among the participating nations, it was not
reasonable to expect international acceptance of United States legal
views on all issues; but it is a laudable feature of the Convention that
the rules it codified are not so unreasonable by American standards as
to make them unacceptable to us. Some of the rules adopted are more
beneficial to American claimants against carriers than would be the
rules applicable in foreign countries in the absence of the Convention;
and in several instances the rules made effective by the Warsaw system
benefit the claimants against carriers more than the rules normally
prevailing in the United States.
One important respect in which the rule of substantive law applied
to air transport by Article 23 of the Convention is preferable to what
might otherwise apply, relates to whether a carrier can stipulate in
the contract of carriage that its liability is limited to a low figure or
that it will be exempt from liability for negligence. Before the adoption of the Warsaw Convention, the carrier could contract with the
passenger to this effect in several countries with which the United
States has a large volume of air traffic. Not only was that rule the law
in the United Kingdom, and other English speaking countries such as
Canada, Australia and the Union of South Africa; but it was effective
in widely scattered countries and under otherwise differing legal
systems, such as in France, Spain, Portugal, Bulgaria and Chile.'6 The
United States does not permit such contracts; so the Convention by
adopting the rule consistent with United States law applies a rule
preferred by United States policy and prevents, to the extent the Convention applies, the application of the opposite rule to United States
citizens abroad.
A second important rule applied by the Convention shifts the
burden of proof from the plaintiff to the carrier. Thus, Article 17
provides that the carrier "shall be liable for damage" and Article 21
relieves the carrier "if he proves that he and his agents have taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for
him to take such measures." This relieves the plaintiff from the
burden he has under the law of the United States to prove the carrier
was negligent and the negligence caused the damage. 17 This advantage
would be valuable in any case, but in aviation litigation it is of significant importance because of the difficulty of proving negligence in
airplane accidents. Dean Wigmore, after studying a number of aviation
accidents in 1937, concluded:
16 Goedhuis, National Airlegislations and the Warsaw Convention, The Hague,
Martinus Nijhoss, 1937. Pages 13, 15, 23, 24, 94, 99.
17 Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., 278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E. 212, 1932
U.S. Av. R. 139 (1932); McCusker v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc., 269 Iil.
App. 502, 1933 U.S. Av. R. 105 (1933) ; Rhyne, Aviation Accident Law 140 (1947).
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"that in 20% of the accidents which have thus far occurred would
it have been possible for the plaintiff to find8 and produce provable
evidence of the real cause of the accident."'
There are other rules applied internationally by the Convention
which are advantageous to United States citizens because they are
preferable to the rules which might otherwise apply to international
air transport. Thus, Article 30 (3) gives the passenger or consignor
the right of action against the first carrier as regards baggage or goods
and gives to the passenger or consignee rights against the last carrier
with respect to such traffic. This is.
preferable to a rule much less convenient which would limit the rights with respect to claims for damage
to baggage or cargo only against the carrier which damaged the prop.erty. The latter rule prevailed in the United States until changed by
the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act in 1906.
The period during which action must be brought against the carriers,
specified in Article 29 of the Convention, is two years; identical with
the period allowed in 29 states in the U. S. and a longer term than is
permitted under the statutes of ten states.' 9
In addition to the advantages gained by United States passengers
and shippers. under the Warsaw Convention, advantages also accrue
to American flag airlines. By standardization, the rules of law that
would otherwise be a confusing uncertainty, are transformed into a
reasonably knowable and insurable responsibility. An important
benefit to our carriers is that by standardizing carrier liability to customers, it prevents foreign flag airlines from obtaining a competitive
advantage in this area of their responsibilities.
The Warsaw Convention, desirable as it,
is for the sake of uniformity, does not carry with it rules so alien to American law as to deprive
American claimants of important rights in the fields thus far discussed.
Rather, from the point of view of American plaintiffs, the Convention
applies, from among the varying alternatives in effect in many of the
nations, relatively desirable rules and in several instances applies rules
more advantageous for claimants than the rules applied in the United
States.
One provision of the Convention, however, has been severely criticized in the United States-the limit on the liability of carriers for
injury or death, and should be discussed in more detail.
18 Sweeney, Report to the Civil Aeronautics Board of a Study of Proposed
Aviation Liability Legislation, 111 (1941). The difficulties of plaintiffs is illustrated
in Lobel v. American Airlines, 182 F. 2d 217 (1951) (Cert. Den.) 342 U.S. 945
96 L. Ed. 703 (1952). There the plaintiff won a $31,000 judgment with the help of
res ipsa loquitur, but when the case was sent back for a new trial because of an
error in the charge to the jury as to res ipsa loquitur, and the plaintiff tried to

prove negligence, he failed to prove it so the verdict went for the defendant. Lobel

v. American Airlines, 205 F. 2d 127 (1953). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does
not shift the burden of proof, as interpreted by the majority of courts in the U. S.
The plaintiff alleging negligence must prove it. Sweeney v. Ewing, 228 U.S. 233
(1913). See also 92 ALR 653 (1934).
19 The Martindale Hubbell Law Directory (1956). Nine states set the period
at more than two years.
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LIMITATION OF THE CARRIER'S LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY OR
DEATH OF PASSENGERS

The provision in the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol
which stirs the greatest controversy and overshadow, in the debate of
those agreements, all other aspects of the Convention or the Protocol,
is the limitation on the liability of carriers for personal injury.
The Convention in Article 22 (1) limits the carriers' liability per
passenger to 125,000 gold francs, approximately $8,292. This would
be increased by the Protocol to double that amount or approximately
$16,584.
The Protocol, however, has an additional provision which permits
the plaintiff to obtain an award of an additional sum of an unspecified
amount for court costs and other expenses of the litigation incurred by
him. 20 The additional award may be made "in accordance with its
(the court's) own law . . ." Since the United States courts generally

do not recognize attorneys' fees as costs, this award, above the judgment, will be available only after changes in rules of court or in
statutes are made. 21 These, however, are domestic matters which can
be arranged without further international agreement, so the Protocol
adds the refinement that if the plaintiff must sue for recovery, the
carrier may be required to pay the expenses of the litigation which
would include the attorney's fees and other expenses incurred in the
litigation.
The criticisms of the limit have been leveled primarily at the limit
of $8,292 presently in the Warsaw Convention. 21a When the Conference
at the Hague doubled the limit to $16,584, the delegates were making
what they regarded as a generous concession to United States views. 22
We contend, therefore, that the major objection to the limit has been
met so far as it is practical to do so, and furthermore, that the increased
The Hague Protocol in Article XI provides in Paragraph 4:
"The limits prescribed in this article shall not prevent the court from
awarding, in accordance with its own law, in addition, the whole or part
of the court costs and of the other expenses of the litigation incurred by
the plaintiff. The foregoing provision shall not apply if the amount of the
damages awarded, excluding court costs and other expenses of the litigation, does not exceed the sum which the carrier has offered in writing to
the plaintiff within a period of six months from the date of the occurrence
causing the damage, or before the commencement of the action, if that is
later.
21 As a general rule, in the absence of any contractual or statutory liability
therefore, attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by the plaintiff or which the
plaintiff is obligated to pay are not recoverable as an item of damages either in
ex contractu or an action ex delicto. See Parks v. Booth, 102 U.S. 96, 26 L. Ed.
54 (1880) ; Guam Service Games v. Shelton, 126 F. Supp. 335 (1954). But statutory provisions authorizing recovery of attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation
as a part of the costs in particular classes of actions have been sustained. Siouz
Co. v. NationalSurety Co., 276 U.S. 237, 72 L. Ed. 547 (1928).
219 The American Bar Association in 1947 (72 A.B.A. Rep. 98, 164) and 1950
(75 A.B.A. Rep. 413-14) adopted resolutions to urge that consideration be given
to an increase in the limit above the $8,292. A joint resolution was introduced in
the 83d and 84th Congress (H.J. Res. 370 and H.J. Res. 191, respectively) that
the CAB take appropriate steps to amend the Warsaw Convention to increase the
limit. The U. S. delegations to the Ninth meeting of ICAO at Rio de Janeiro in
1953 and to the Conference at The Hague in 1955 were under instructions to
increase the limit of liability.
22 See Calkins, The Hague Protocol, page 263, this issue.
20
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limit makes this aspect of the Convention acceptable to the United
States on its merits.
An important reason why the limit as proposed in the Protocol
should be accepted by the United States is that it provides for American
citizens a higher limit on recoveries for personal injury in international
air transportation than would apply to Americans under the law of
many foreign countries in the absence of the Convention and Protocol.
Since Americans injured in foreign countries must look to the law of
those countries for the right of recovery and the limit on recovery, if
any, our residents must consider what they would face abroad in the
event of an accident outside the United States. 23 The listed countries limit the amount of recovery by statute at a limit lower than is
24
prescribed in the Protocol.

Additional countries apply statutory limits lower than those in
the Hague Protocol by virtue of their legislation which applies the
Warsaw limit of $8,292 to non-Warsaw air transportation. These are
Norway, Greece and the United Kingdom. 25 The Warsaw Convention,
as amended, has the effect, therefore, for American citizens injured in
those countries of substituting for these statutory limits the figure of
$16,584.
The amount set in the Protocol is also reasonable when compared
with the limit on recoveries applicable under American law to passengers on seagoing vessels. Under the law applicable prior to 1935 in
the United States, vessel owners were held liable only to the amount or
23 Indemnity Ins. Co. v. PAA. 57 F. Supp. 980, 981 (1944). W. W. Clyde &
Co. v. Dyess, 126 F. 2d 719, 721 (1942) Cert. Den. 317 U. S. 638 (1942) "Air
passenger deaths resulting from injuries sustained on or over the High Seas and
at Unknown Places," (1956), Corn L. Q. 243.
Even if United States citizens suing abroad might in some cases be able to
base their suit on the contract of carriage rather than tort law, many would sue
in United States courts which would base the recovery on tort law, and apply the
law of the jurisdiction where the injury was inflicted. "The measure of damages
for a tort is governed by the law of the place where the tort was committed . . .
there too was the right to damages created and the measure of them settled. So
the measure of damages for death is determined by the law of the place where
the fatal injury occurred." Beale, Conflict of Laws, 1333 (1935).
24
Approximate
Country
Limit
U. S. Equivalent
Belgium
250,000 Frs.
$ 5,000
Brazil
100,000 Cruzeiros
5,405.41
Denmark
18,250 Kr.
2,645
Germany
20,000 Marks
7,460
Italy
160,000 Lira
256
Luxembourg
375,000 Fr.
7,500
Mexico
75,000 Pesos
8,670.52
Netherlands
12,500 Fl.
3,289
New Zealand
5,000 Pounds
13,964
Poland
10,000 Zloty
Sweden
18,250 Kr.
3,509
Costa Rica
20,000 Colons
3,561.88
Guatemala
5,000 Quetzels
5,000
The amounts are taken from a tabulation prepared by the ICAO Secretariat
in 1953, Doc. 7450-LC 136, Vol. II, Annex VI, Appendix VII, Ninth Session of the
Legal Committee, Rio de Janeiro, 25 August-12 September, 1953.
25 ICAO Doc. 7450-LC 136, supra footnote 24.
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value of the interest of each owner in the vessel and her freight pending
at the time of the suit. 26 If the vessel was lost, the owner could conceivably have no liability to the claimants because the vessel had no value
at the time of the suit. This was changed by Congress in 1935 so that
owners of seagoing vessels had to make available a minimum of $60
per ton "of such vessel's tonnage" for the payment of "losses in respect
of loss of life or bodily injury. ' 27 If this formula is applied to a vessel
of 30,000 tons, the $60 liability would total $1,800,000. If divided
among the approximately 1,000 passengers which can be carried on
such a vessel, the liability per passenger would be $1800. While the
recoveries may be higher than $16,600 if the value of the vessel is high
at the time of the suit, nevertheless, if the vessel is lost, the liability
could be as low as $1800 per passenger depending on the fund required
by the tonnage of the vessel and the number of passengers among whom
the fund must be divided.
The Protocol limit is also reasonable when considered in the light
of the statutory limits for wrongful death in the United States. The
Hague limit is higher than in four states where the limits range between $10,000 and $15,000.28

In other states, although the statutory limit is higher, the WarsawHague limit permits a higher net recovery. This results from the aid
the plaintiff is given under the Convention and Protocol; first he is
spared proving negligence and second, his recovery is not reduced by.
the attorneys' fees and costs of litigation if pre-trial settlement offers
26

(1940).

For a full discussion, see Knauth, 3 Benedict on Admiralty 310, et seq.

27 § 183. Amount of liability; loss of life or bodily injury; privity imputed
to owner; "seagoing vessel."
(a) The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign,
for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property, goods, or
merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or
injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture,
done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner or
owners, shall not, except in the cases provided for in subsection (b) of this section,
exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her
freight then pending.
(b) In the case of any seagoing vessel, if the amount of the owner's liability
as limited under subsection (a) is insufficient to pay all losses in full, and the
portion of such amount applicable to the payment of losses in respect of loss of life
or bodily injury is less than $60 per ton of such vessel's tonnage, such portion shall
be increased to an amount equal to $60 per ton, to be available only for the payment of losses in respect of loss of life or bodily injury. If such portion so increased
in insufficient to pay such losses in full, they shall be paid therefrom in proportion
to their respective amounts. (49 Stat. 960 [1936]; 46 U.S.C.A. 183 (a) (b) (1955)
Pocket Part.)
28 Colorado $10,000 (Col. Rev. Stat., 1955 Cum. Supp. Sec. 41-1-3); Indiana
$15,000 (Burns Consol. Ind. Stat., 1955 Cum. Supp. Sec. 2-404) ; Maine $10,000
plus damages for conscious suffering, and expenses for medical, surgical and hospital care. (Rev. Stat. of Maine 1954, Ch. 165, Sec. 10); New Hampshire $7,500,
unless decedent has left either a widow, widower, minor children or a dependent
father or mother, in which case the limit is $15,000. (N. H. Rev. Stat. Anno. 1955,
Sec. 556-13).
A question has been raised whether, in states with limits in statutes for
recovery for wrongful death at amounts lower than $16,600, the Warsaw-Hague
provisions will permit higher recoveries. It has been argued that since Warsaw
creates no new cause of action, the state statute must be relied on and the lower
limit coupled to the right of action will govern.
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were less than the judgment. To net $16,584 in the usual case after
attorneys' fees, the plaintiff must get a judgment of $25,000 or $32,000i
depending on the local practice as to contingency fees. 29 To net
$16,584 after attorneys' fees and costs of litigation, he must get a judgment for $27,000 or more. These are high awards in any case and are
higher than the statutory limits prescribed in the other states which
limit recoveries for wrongful death.8 0
The limit of liability is also acceptable because it achieves desirable
social goals at a more reasonable cost than might otherwise be entailed
and apportions the costs in a justifiable manner.
For the average passenger claimant in international air transport
the Warsaw-Hague provisions permits a net recovery that makes available more compensation more readily than is true in other personal
injury situations. The social interest in getting reasonable compensation to the average claimants promptly is so great that several proposals
to improve the compensation for personal injury and death in automobile accident cases, for example, have recommended that if a scheme
were devised which would expedite and assure reasonable compensation, a limit of liability as low as $6,500 per person is justifiable.3 '
For the above average passenger who wants more protection than
the $16,584 provided in the Hague Protocol, the Warsaw system requires that he obtain it from other sources. This is relatively easy to
do. Insurance is conveniently available in form and amount. Three
29 Attorneys' fees have been 50% of the recovery so consistently that the rules
of the courts of the City of New York have recently been amended, effective January 1, 1957, limiting the fees for recovery to approximately 33%. Thus according
to the formula specified in those rules, if the plaintiff wins a judgment of $25,000,
the attorneys' fees will be $9,000. But to the extent the plaintiff must bear the other
costs of litigation, which can be conservatively estimated to be $2,000 in a case
of this kind, the plaintiff's net would be nearer $14,000. For a discussion of high
attorneys' fees, see "The Future of Insurance Awards and Compensation," Murphy
(1953), Insurance Law Journal 90.
30 The following limitations apply to recoveries for wrongful death: Illinois,
$25,000 (Ill. Anno. Statutes (1955) Ch. 70. Sec. 2 (Smith Hurd 1955) ; Kansas,
$25,000 (G.S. (1955) Supp., Sec. 60-3203 (Corrick 1955); Massachusetts, $20,000,
Anno. Laws of Mass., Ch. 229, Sec. 2C (1955); Minnesota, $17,500, Minn. Stat.
Anno. (1955) Pocket Part, Sec. 573.02; Missouri, $25,000, Rev. Stat. of Missouri
(1949), Cum. Supp. 1955, Sec. 537.090; Oregon, $20,000, Oreg. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Sec. 30.020; South Dakota, $20,000 (1952), Supp. So. Dak. Code of 1939, Title 37,
Ch. 37.22, Sec. 37.2203; Virginia, $25.000. Va. Code (1950) (1956) Cum. Supp.,
Sec. 8-636; West Virginia, $20,000, W. Va. Code (1955) Ann., Sec. 5475 (6);
Wisconsin, $15,000 plus additional sums for spouses, children, and parents, Wis.
Stat., 1951, Sec. 331.04; Alaska, however, has a $50,000 limit. A.C.L.A. (1949)
Sec. 61-7-3, as amended Ch. 153 Session Laws of Alaska, (1955).
81 In the "Report of the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile
Accidents" (Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences
1932), the Committee found several shortcomings in the operation of the fault
principle of liability as it then operated in the Courts; among them were(1) The burden of proving fault
(2) The heavy cost of attorneys' fees
The study concluded that assurance of some recovery was so important that it
recommended a compensation scheme with limits from $4,500 to $6,500 for permanent serious injury or death. For discussion of recent proposals to establish
compensatory schemes to aid claimants, even though the maximum recoveries would
be limited to less than the Hague Protocol limits, see: Grad, "Recent Developments
in Automobile Accident Compensation" (1950) 50 Col. L. Rev. 300.
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insurers now offer at airport terminals insurance for passengers up to
$62,500.32 By buying from more than one insurer, up to $187,500
coverage can be obtained. The cost of this insurance for domestic and
some foreign transportation is 20 cents per $5,000. The cost of insurance for transportation to other foreign points is sold at a somewhat
higher rate. The convenience and availability of this insurance is
greater with respect to air transportation than with respect to any
38
other form of transportation, either domestic or international.
The advantage of this machinery for making the larger recovery
available to the passenger who wishes it, is that by this method only
the people who want recoveries in high amounts incur the expense of
such protection. The cost of the protection is not charged to those
passengers who neither have the need for nor can qualify for higher
recoveries.

84

In summary, we have contrasted the advantages of continuing a
uniform system of international law with the disadvantages the
amended Convention would bring. Uniformity in this growing international commerce offers many favorable advantages to the users and
operators of American flag airlines, against which, however, must be
weighed the effects of the limit on liability of the carrier for personal
injury of passengers. These effects, we believe, are not very serious.
The limit as increased by the Protocol, is a substantial concession to
the objections raised to the original limit. The new limit is reasonable
by several tests; it compares favorably with other statutory limits in
the U. S. and permits a net recovery which compares well with net
recoveries in other cases in the United States. For passengers who wish
higher recoveries, adequate and convenient facilities are provided to
afford them those opportunities. We urge, therefore, that the uniformity of international law established by the Warsaw Convention be
continued by the early ratification of the Hague Protocol.
32 Three insurers making accident policies available at airports are Associated
Aviation Underwriters, New York; Continental Casualty, Chicago, Illinois; and
Mutual of Omaha, Omaha, Nebraska.
88 At railroad and bus line ticket offices, the traveler can buy an accident
insurance policy for $10,000 for 25 cents per day, issued by the Travelers Insurance
Company, Hartford, Connecticut. Travelers by vessel do not depart from "terminals" as do travelers by train, bus and airplane, but through authorized travel
agents they can purchase accident insurance for as much as $55,000 for 180 days
for $129.50, issued by Continental Casualty Company, Chicago, and a similar
policy issued by the Home Insurance Company, New York. These latter policies
insure against accidents occurring on and off of the vessel during the insured period.
84 "The main job of accident law is, therefore, to promote the well being of
accident victims if this can be done without imposing too great a social cost in
other directions ...
"Of prime importance is the fact that wherever there is widely held insurance,
tort liability no longer merely shifts a loss from one individual to another but it
tends to distribute the loss according to the principles of insurance, and the person
nominally liable is often only a conduit through whom this process of distribution
starts to flow. This does not at all mean that the loss disappears and does not have
to be paid for. But it does mean that you ought to know who is paying for it, and
in what proportions, before you can really see and evaluate what is going on even
in terms of the fault principle."
"Accident Liability Reconsidered" F. James, Jr. (1948) 57 Yale Law Journal
549, 569, 551-2.

